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OTIS ELEVATOR CO. v. EMBERT
TORT LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES ARISING
FROM BREACH OF CONTRACT
Otis Elevator Company v. Embert'
The plaintiff, was injured when she fell into an auto-
matic passenger elevator, located in a building owned by
the South Street Corporation, defendant number one. The
accident occurred when the plaintiff, having opened the
elevator door and thinking the elevator was at floor level,
entered and fell approximately twelve and one-half inches
to the point where the elevator was actually located. The
plaintiff brought suit in the Baltimore City Court against
the aforementioned corporation, building owner. The latter
made the Otis Elevator Company a third-party defendant,
alleging that Otis was liable for breach of a contract to
furnish maintenance on the elevator. The plaintiff then
filed an amended declaration, charging negligence on the
part of the South Street Corporation and the Otis Elevator
Company. The jury found both defendants negligent but
held for Otis in the third-party action.2 Otis appealed and
the building owner, having paid the judgment, defended
the appeal as use plaintiff. As to the liability of Otis, the
Maryland Court of Appeals reversed. The Court said that
the only way to find Otis liable was in tort for breach of its
maintenance contract, as Otis had assumed no duties other
than those arising from the contract. There could be no
liability in contract as there was no privity between the
plaintiff and Otis. There would be tort liability where the
breach of contract was also a disregard of the duty, owed
the public by Otis, which arose at the making of the con-
tract. The court did not hold that Otis was charged with
such a duty to one not in privity of contract; but it merely
said that, assuming that to be the Maryland law, there
1 198 Md. 585, 84 A. 2d 876 (1951).
' This verdict of the jury is a bit confusing, at first glance. When the
plaintiff filed an amended declaration, alleging negligence on the part of both
defendants, the South Street Corporation asked the court's permission to
refile its third-party complaint against Otis. The latter objected on the
ground that this was improper after the amended declaration had been filed
and issue joined thereon by both defendants. The court overruled the
objection. It seems that the proper label for the "third-party complaint"
at this point in the proceedings would have been a cross claim against a
co-party in accord with Part Two, III, Joinder Rule 3(b) of the General
Rules of Practice and Procedure. At any rate the third-party complaint
alleged that Otis was liable to the South Street Corporation for breach of
the maintenance contract. It was on this point that the jury held for Otis,
while, on the other hand, finding Otis liable to the plaintiff for negligence




was no breach of contract in this case. Therefore, there
was no disregard of the alleged duty.
In other words, the only point really decided was that
the Otis Elevator Company only contracted to maintain the
elevator in proper mechanical condition, as distinguished
from modernizing it and agreeing to teach how to operate
it,' and that there was no evidence to show that any
mechanical defect caused or directly contributed to the
accident complained of. However, speaking through Judge
Markell, the Court did discuss the question of tort liability
to third parties growing out of breach of contract, and
referred to various types of cases, both in Maryland and
elsewhere, in which such liability had been enforced or
claimed.
To analyze some of these cases and to determine the
basis on which such liability actually rests, with particular
emphasis on the development of the Maryland law in this
respect, is the purpose of this note.4
The difficulty in finding liability in such cases mainly
stems from the misinterpreted English case of Winterbot-
tom v. Wright.5 In that case it was decided that for breach
of a contract to keep a mail coach in repair after it was sold,
no cause of action existed in one not a party to the contract.
As pointed out by Dean Prosser in his textbook:
"... the decision went no farther than to hold that
no action could be maintained on the contract itself;
but it was universally misinterpreted, and certain dicta
of the judges were taken to mean that there could be
no action even in tort, and even if the chattel had been
in a defective condition when it was supplied. Spring-
ing from this decision, there developed a general rule
which prevailed until quite recent years, that the
original seller of goods was not liable for damages
sThe negligence of the South Street Corporation was principally based
upon its failure to warn or advise passengers regarding the operation of
the elevator. Cf. Lee v. Housing Authority, Baltimore Daily Record, Jan. 19,
1954 (Md., 1954).
' The related problem of proving the negligence, once It is determined that
a cause of action in tort may exist, is not discussed in this note. This
problem has arisen in Maryland, especially in the food and beverage cases,
which cases are mentioned later in the note, infra, circa, ns. 15 and 16. For
a discussion of the proof problem in these and other similar cases, where
to prove negligence is extremely difficult, see Thomsen, Presumptions and
Burden of Proof in Res Ipaa Loquitur Cases in Maryland, 3 Md. L. Rev. 285
(1939) ; Farinholt, Res Ip8a Loquitur, 10 Md. L. Rev. 337 (1949), and
Kaiser, Pleading Negligence in Maryland - Res Ipsa Loquitur as a Rule of
Pleading, 11 Md. L. Rev. 102 (1950). Cf. Lee v. Housing Authority, ibid.
510 M. & W. 109, 11 L. J. Ex. 415, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
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caused by their defects to anyone except his immediate
buyer.6
However, the above rule is more famous for its exceptions
than the rule itself.
One leading exception concerns a seller's liability in
tort for harm to a third party where the foreseeable harm
was due to the seller's negligence. The principal case is
that of Thomas v. Winchester7 decided ten years after the
aforementioned English case.8 In that case the plaintiff, a
remote vendee, sued a dealer in drugs and medicines whose
agent had negligently mislabelled a poisonous drug. The
plaintiff recovered in tort although there was no privity
of contract between him and the defendant. The court
held that because of the danger involved in dealing with
poisonous drugs the defendant owed the public a duty to
avoid such mistakes? In this respect it is to be noted that
the disregard of the duty to the public was also a breach of
contract with the immediate vendee.
In a Maryland case, State, use of Hartlove v. Fox & Son,10
the court's opinion quoted extensively from, but did not go
the full extent of Thomas v. Winchester. In the Maryland
case the plaintiff's decedent died from a disease contracted
from a horse bought by the decedent's brother from the
defendant. The Court, although it sustained the defendant's
demurrer on the ground that the allegations in the declara-
tion were insufficient to support a cause of action in the
plaintiff, pointed out that if a vendor makes a false repre-
sentation, concerning the subject matter of the sale, know-
ing it may cause damage to a third party who was not a
party to said sale, then he, the defendant vendor, would be
liable to the third party.
The Maryland court never applied this rule in its en-
tirety. That portion of the rule requiring intentional mis-
representation was not adopted, as will be seen from an
examination of later cases.
"PROSSER, TORTS (1941), 673-674.
'6 N. Y. (2 Selden) 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
8 Supra, n. 5.
9 Supra, n. 7, 410.
"The defendant's duty arose out of the nature of his business, and
the danger to others incident to its mismanagement. The duty of exer-
cising caution in this respect did not arise out of the defendant's con-
tract of sale to Aspinwall.... The wrong done by the defendant was in
putting the poison, mislabelled, into the hands of Aspinwall, as an
article of merchandise, to be sold and afterwards used, as the extract
of dandelion, by some person then unknown."
Aspinwall was the defendant's immediate vendee who was not a party
to the suit.
-79 Md. 514, 29 A. 601 (1894).
1954]
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In Flaccomio v. Eysink," the plaintiff sued a retail
whiskey dealer and a wholesale whiskey dealer for injuries
received from whiskey adulterated with wood alcohol. The
plaintiff did not recover from either. However, the decision
with regard to the wholesale dealer was not based on the
fact that there was lacking privity of contract between
him and the plaintiff, but because he was not negligent.
The Court in mentioning the plaintiff-appellee's argument,
which was based on Thomas v. Winchester" and similar
cases, said, "the cases relied on by the appellee do not war-
rant a different conclusion, but in our judgment fully sus-
tain this view"." In them, "the plaintiff's right to recover
was based on averment and proof of the defendant's negli-
gence in labeling and selling a deadly poison". 4 Thus the
Court intimated that in a proper case a defendant vendor
would be found liable to a remote vendee for negligence.
Such a proper case, Goldman and Freiman Bottling Co.,
Inc., v. Sindell,15 arose in 1922. The Court allowed the plain-
tiff, a remote vendee, to recover from the defendant bottling
company for internal injuries suffered from the drinking
of a bottle of soda, which contained glass particles. The
defendant's argument that it could not be charged with
negligence, and that, since there was no privity of contract
there was no liability, was overruled. The liability was
predicated on negligence; there was no intentional mis-
representation involved in the case. Here was the full
application of the doctrine of Thomas v. Winchester. The
doctrine has since been applied in other Maryland cases
involving bottling companies and food manufacturers. 6
Therefore, concerning the sale of food and beverage, which,
if adulterated with foreign matter, is imminently dangerous
to the public and will probably cause harm, the Court of
Appeals will hold the negligent party liable to the injured
party in an ex delicto action.
Another exception to the Winterbottom v. Wright 7 rule
or an expansion of the "imminent danger to the public"
doctrine, which ever one prefers to call it, arose in the case
of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company."' There the de-
- 129 Md. 367, 100 A. 510 (1916).
2 Supra, n. 7.
Supra, n. 11, 374.
11 Ibid, 377. The emphasis Is that of the court.
-140 Md. 488, 117 A. 866 (1922).
"0 Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 177 Md. 393, 9 A. 2d 572 (1939) ; Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Catron. 186 Md. 156, 46 A. 2d 303 (1946) ; Cloverland
Farms Dairy v. Ellin, 195 Md. 663, 75 A. 2d 116 (1950).
17 Supra, n. 5.
-217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
[VOL. XIV
OTIS ELEVATOR CO. v. EMBERT
fendant manufactured automobiles, and bought its wheels
from a reputable wheel manufacturer. The plaintiff bought
his car from a retail dealer, and was injured when one of
the wheels proved defective and collapsed. The defendant
had failed to inspect this wheel and was found liable for
this negligence. The Court pointed out that an automobile
was of such a nature that if it was not carefully made it
would almost certainly cause injury to someone of the
general public, i.e., anyone who might purchase it from the
retailer, and those who might be riding with him, or with
whom he might collide because of the defect. The Court
then said:
"We hold, then, that the principle of Thomas v.
Winchester is not limited to poisons, explosives, and
things of like nature, to things which in their normal
operation are implements of destruction. If the nature
of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then
a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the con-
sequences to be expected. If to the element of danger
there is added knowledge that the thing will be used
by persons other than the purchaser, and used without
new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufac-
turer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make
it carefully."'19
This decision has been followed in most courts which
have since dealt with the problem concerning manufac-
turers.2 ° The idea of inherent danger apparently means no
more than that substantial harm is to be foreseen if the
chattel is defective.2
The Maryland Court of Appeals has never expressly
applied the rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company.
However, there are five cases, closely touching on the prin-
ciple here involved, which should be reviewed, the latest of
which says that the rule of the MacPherson case has re-
ceived a "qualified recognition in Maryland".
First is the case of Consolidated Gas Company v. Con-
nor,22 which was decided prior to the MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Company case. There the defendant had a contract
with the city to repair the gas pipes. The defendant negli-
gently sent gas through a defective gas pipe, injuring a
'D Ibid, 1053.
2D PRossE, op. cit., supra, n. 6, 678.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934), Sec. 395.
114 Md. 140, 78 A. 725 (1910).
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third party, the plaintiff, and was held liable. However,
the court treated the defendant gas company as an agent of
the city, and liable to third parties for its misfeasance. A
later case,23 decided recently, also involved the alleged neg-
ligence of a Gas company. There the negligence amounted
to nonfeasance and the defendant was not held liable. The
nonfeasance consisted of failure to have a certain street
light repaired within a reasonable time. The Court noted
the earlier Maryland case,24 and distinguished the two on
the ground of misfeasance and nonfeasance.
However, in the case now being noted,25 Judge Markell,
delivering the court's opinion, said:
"If one contracts with a municipality to furnish
water or gas or electricity for public and private pur-
poses and fails to do so, he incurs no tort liability for
damage by fire due to lack of water to extinguish the
fire or for injury sustained in the darkness due to lack
of gas or electricity. The absence of tort liability for
breach of contract is not qualified by the distinction
between nonfeasance and misfeasance. In such cases
such a distinction is not between non-performance and
'misperformance' of a contract, but only between con-
duct, in breach of a contract, which constitutes only a
breach of contract, and conduct which also constitutes
a breach of duty, arising out of the nature of the work
undertaken and the conduct, to third persons."2
The third case is that of State of Maryland, to the use
of Bond, et al., v. Consolidated Gas, Electric Light and
Power Company. There the alleged negligence was selling
a defective gas stove which injured a third party. Here the
defendant was a retail dealer, not a manufacturer, and also,
there was no allegation that "the article in itself was in-
herently dangerous".2 These features the court declared
distinguished this case from the problem confronting the
New York Court in MacPherson v. The Buick Motor Com-
pany.29 In holding that there was no liability the Court said:
"... authorities, in this State and elsewhere, which
hold that a manufacturer is liable for injury to




146 Md. 390, 126 A. 305,42 A. L. R. 1237 (1924).
2Ibid, 399.
"Supra, n. 18.
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strangers resulting from the sale of articles inherently
dangerous, do not apply to cases like the one under
consideration."3
The fourth case31 was not decided by the Court of Ap-
peals, but it shows that the Baltimore City Court con-
sidered MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company32 to be the
law in Maryland. The question before the Court was
whether or not the Chevrolet Motor Company was liable
as a joint tort feasor for the breaking of defective new
superglass. The Court followed the MacPherson case and,
after quoting from that opinion, held Chevrolet liable. The
Court said:
"It is to be gathered.., that when confronted with
a case for decision which presents the same controlling
features as were present in 217 N. Y. 382,33 which the
case at bar as made out in the declaration manifestly
does, that the Maryland Court of Appeals will follow
the precedent, so luminously and convincingly set by
Justice Cardozo. ' '34
Finally, in the fifth and latest case, decided after the
principal case, an electrician was injured by falling twenty
feet due to the mechanism for opening an overhead garage
door (on which he was standing) loosening and falling
apart. In holding that there should have been directed ver-
dicts in favor of the manufacturer and the installer of the
doors, neither of whom was in control thereof at the time
of the accident, the Court of Appeals said:
"With the plaintiff's contention that the garage
doors were a dangerous instrumentality under the rule
of MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050,
we do not agree. The doctrine has received a qualified
recognition in Maryland, but has not been applied in
any case resembling the one before us. See Otis Eleva-
tor v. Embert, 198 Md. 585, 84 A. 2d 876. ''13 a
The final line of cases to be discussed involves mainte-
nance contracts similar to the one present in the principal
10 Supra, n. 27, 397.
1 Kemich v. Legum, et al., Baltimore Daily Record, Nov. 20, 1933 (Balti-
more City Court, 1933).
1 Supra, n. 18.
Ibid.
Supra, n. 31.




case." Where the contract to maintain concerned an instru-
mentality which was dangerous in itself, or one which, if
negligently repaired, was dangerous and likely to injure
some member of the public, it would certainly seem that
the failure to properly repair should result in tort liability,
irrespective of the contract. The reason for such liability
would be the same as it has been in the cases already dis-
cussed. That is, the breach of the contract was also a dis-
regard of the duty owed the public, because of the nature
of the undertaking.
The Maryland Court apparently recognizes the close
analogy between MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company36
and a case involving the breach of a maintenance contract
where the probability of injury to the public is strong. In
the principal case, for the purposes of the opinion, the Court
assumed that Maryland followed MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Company. Even so, the court said that Otis was not
liable, on the ground that there had been no breach of con-
tract and so no disregard of duty. The significance of this
is that the Court thus indicated that at least concerning
elevators, the doctrine of the MacPherson case applied to
maintenance contracts.
Other courts have found tort liability to a third party
for the breach of a maintenance contract or one similar
thereto. In Van Winkle v. American Steam Boiler Com-
pany,37 decided over twenty-five years before the Mac-
Pherson case, it was held that an insurance company, which
under its policy reserved the right to inspect an insured
boiler and which, although it had no duty to inspect, in fact
did repeatedly inspect the boiler, was liable in tort to an
adjoining owner for damage caused by the explosion of the
boiler, on account of negligence with respect to making its
inspections. The Court really based its decision on the mis-
feasance of an agent for which agents are generally held
liable. But after talking Agency the Court said:
"And it would seem that there is a broader ground
.. on which the present case can be based. It is this:
that in all cases in which any person undertakes the
performance of an act, which, if not done with care and
skill, will be highly dangerous to the persons or lives
of one or more persons, known or unknown, the law
ipso facto, imposes, as a public duty, the obligation to
exercise such care and skill. ' '3 8
Supra, n. 1.
Supra, n. 18.
52 N. J. L. 240, 19 A. 472 (1890).
-8 Ibid, 475.
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A Pennsylvania case,3 9 decided in 1929, where an insurance
company was held not liable as it had not undertaken to
inspect, declared there would be liability if the company
had undertaken to inspect and done so negligently. This
case cited the Van Winkle case ° with approval in this point.
In the case of Dahms v. General Elevator Company,1
the California courts dealt with practically the same fact
set up as is found in the principal case. In the Dahms case
the plaintiff, an elevator operator, was injured due to the
breaking of the hoisting shaft. The defendant had a con-
tract, to maintain the elevator, with the building owner.
The defendant was held liable. The defendant was charged
with having the same duties toward the public as manufac-
turers and vendors. The Court considered this type of case
one of the exceptions to the rule set forth in Winterbottom
v. Wright.43 And at one point in the opinion it was said,
"... an action sounding in negligence may be maintained
by a stranger to a contract for the execution of a specific
piece of work or the sale of a manufactured article, if the
product of the stipulated work or the article sold was
abnormally dangerous or noxious'. This last statement
was extended to cover articles which, although not dan-
gerous in themselves, were dangerous if negligently made
or constructed.
A later California case45 also allowed recovery under a
similar set of facts where the plaintiff was a passenger in
the elevator.
New York, where the doctrine involved in these cases
was so well developed, has held" that "an elevator was a
dangerous instrumentality within the doctrine of Thomas
v. Winchester,47 and that one who contracted to repair an
elevator owed the same duty to third persons as a manu-
facturer.
48
While there are other cases involving the liability of adefendant to third parties for negligence in failure to in-
Anderson v. London Guaranty & Accident Company, 295 Pa. 368, 145 A.
431 (1929).
,0 Supra, n. 37.
41214 Cal. 733, 7 P. 2d 1013 (1932).
Supra, n. 1.
" Supra, n. 5.
"Supra, n. 41, 1015.
," Cowles v. Independent Elevator Company, 22 Cal. App. 2d 109, 70 P.
2d 711 (1937).
,1 Kahner v. Otis Elevator Company, 96 App. Div. 169, 89 N. Y. S. 185
(1904).
"Supra, n. 7.




spect" or repair 50 an elevator where such negligence caused
injury, they do not add substantially to the doctrines herein
discussed.
There is no attempt being made to distinguish between
contracts to inspect and contracts to repair. The type of
contract involved in the principal case5 was a maintenance
contract. Under such an agreement there is a duty both to
inspect and repair. Therefore, failure to do either would
bring about liability should such failure cause injury to
someone.
We now see that the law has made real progress since
the days of Winterbottom v. Wright.2 When one enters
into a contract, the breach of which is fraught with real
probability of hazard to many unsuspecting members of
the public, tort liability to a third party cannot be escaped
by hiding behind the contract. The tortfeasor is held re-
sponsible to the injured party, and this is as the law reason-
ably should be. Where negligence can and is likely to in-
jure, to hold that no cause of action in tort exists because
the wrongdoer's act was merely a breach of contract is con-
trary to fundamental concepts of justice.
The Maryland Court, in its holdings, has only applied
such liability in the food and beverage cases, but its dicta,
it is believed, does not oppose the extension of the doctrine
to cover manufacturers, vendors and maintenance contrac-
tors, provided, of course, that the necessary element of wide
possibility of danger is present.
," Westinghouse Electric Elevator Company v. Hatcher, 133 F. 2d 109 (5th
Cir., 1943) ; Bollin v. Elevator Construction and Repair Company, Inc., 361
Pa. 7, 63 A. 2d 19, 6 A. L. R. 2d 277 (1949). Here the Court said the prin-
ciple of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, aupra, n. 18, governed the
case at hand.
W Jones v. Otis Elevator Company, 231 N. C. 285, 56 S. E. 2d 684 (1949);
Higgins v. Otis Elevator Company, 69 Ga. App. 584, 26 S. E. 2d 380 (1943).
Here the contract was to inspect and repair.
1Supra, n. 1.
1 Supra, n. 5.
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